

those distant ideas are not merely distant in space and time, but equally likely to be occurring in the department next door, and as the *encasements* are presumably realized in preferred rhetorical and linguistic choices, the genre-based approach proposed in this volume can hope, at least, for some enlightenment from the world's most charismatic cultural anthropologist.

PART II KEY CONCEPTS

2 The concept of discourse community

2.1 A need for clarification

Discourse community, the first of three terms to be examined in Part II, has so far been principally appropriated by instructors and researchers adopting a 'Social View' (Faigley, 1986) of the writing process. Although I am not aware of the original provenance of the term itself, formative influences can be traced to several of the leading 'relativist' or 'social constructionist' thinkers of our time. Herzberg (1986) instances Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's *The New Rhetoric* (1969), Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1970) and Fish's *Is There a Text in this Class?* (1980). Porter (1988) discusses the significance of Foucault's analysis of 'discursive formations' in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972); other contributors are Rorty (*Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 1979) and Geertz (*Local Knowledge*, 1983), with Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (1958) as an earlier antecedent (Bruffee, 1986), particularly perhaps for the commentary therein on 'language games' (3.5).

Whatever the genealogy of the term discourse community, the relevant point in the present context is that it has been appropriated by the 'social perspectivists' for their variously applied purposes in writing research. It is this use that I wish to explore and in turn appropriate. Herzberg (1986) sets the scene as follows:

Use of the term 'discourse community' testifies to the increasingly common assumption that discourse operates within conventions defined by communities, be they academic disciplines or social groups. The pedagogies associated with writing across the curriculum and academic English now use the notion of 'discourse communities' to signify a cluster of ideas: that language use in a group is a form of social behavior, that discourse is a means of maintaining and extending the group's knowledge and of initiating new members into the group, and that discourse is epistemic or constitutive of the group's knowledge.

(Herzberg, 1986:1)

Irrespective of the merits of this 'cluster of ideas', the cluster is, I suggest, *consequential* of the assumption that there are indeed entities identifiable as discourse communities, not *criterial* for establishing or identifying them. They point us towards asking *how* a particular discourse community uses its discursive conventions to initiate new members or *how* the discourse of another reifies particular values or beliefs. While such questions are well worth asking, they do not directly assist with the logically prior ones of how we recognize such communities in the first place.

Herzberg in fact concedes that there may be a definitional problem: 'The idea of "discourse community" is not well defined as yet, but like many imperfectly defined terms, it is suggestive, the center of a set of ideas rather than the sign of a settled notion' (1986:1). However, if discourse community is to be 'the center of a set of ideas' – as it is in this book – then it becomes reasonable to expect it to be, if not a settled notion, at least one that is sufficiently explicit for others to be able to accept, modify or reject on the basis of the criteria proposed.

Several other proponents of the 'social view', while believing that discourse community is a powerful and useful concept, recognize it currently raises as many questions as it answers. Porter (1988:2), for instance, puts one set of problems with exemplary conciseness: 'Should discourse communities be determined by shared objects of study, by common research methodology, by opportunity and frequency of communication, or by genre and stylistic conventions?' Fennell et al. (1987) note that current definitions have considerable vagueness and in consequence offer little guidance in identifying discourse communities. They further point out that definitions which emphasize the reciprocity of 'discourse' and 'community' (community involves discourse and discourse involves community) suffer the uncomfortable fate of ending up circular.

We need then to clarify, for procedural purposes, what is to be understood by discourse community and, perhaps in the present circumstances, it is better to offer a set of criteria sufficiently narrow that it will eliminate many of the marginal, blurred and controversial contenders. A 'strong' list of criteria will also avoid the circularity problem, because in consequence it will certainly follow that not all communities – as defined on other criteria – will be discourse communities, just as it will follow that not all discourse activity is relevant to discourse community consolidation. An exclusionary list will also presumably show that the kind of disjunctive question raised by Porter is misplaced. It is likely to show that neither shared object of study nor common procedure nor interaction nor agreed discursive convention will themselves individually be necessary and sufficient conditions for the emergence of a discourse community, although a combination of some or all might. Conversely,

the absence of any one (different subject areas, conflicting procedures, no interaction, and multiple discourse conventions) may be enough to prevent discourse community formation – as international politics frequently reminds us.

It is possible, of course, that there is no pressing need to clarify the concept of *discourse community* because, at the end of the account, it will turn out to be nothing more than composition specialists' convenient translation of the long-established concept of *speech community* common to sociolinguistics and central to the ethnography of communication. This view, for example, would seem to be the position of Freed and Broadhead (1987). After a couple of opening paragraphs on *speech community* in linguistics and on audience analysis, they observe, 'only recently have compositional studies begun to investigate communities of writers and readers, though the terminology seems to be changing to "discourse communities" in order to signal the focus on the written rather than the spoken' (1987:154). Whether it is appropriate to identify *discourse community* with a subset of *speech community* is the topic of the next section.

2.2 Speech communities and discourse communities

Speech community has been an evolving concept in sociolinguistics and the consequent variety of definitional criteria has been discussed – among others – by Hudson (1980), Saville-Troike (1982) and especially by Braithwaite (1984). At the outset, a speech community was seen as being composed of those who share similar *linguistic rules* (Bloomfield, 1933), and in those terms we could legitimately refer to, say, the speech community of the English-speaking world. Later, Labov will emphasize 'shared norms' rather than shared performance characteristics but still conclude that 'New York City is a single speech community, and not a collection of speakers living side by side, borrowing occasionally from each other's dialects' (Labov, 1966:7). Others, such as Fishman (1971), have taken as criterial patterned regularities in the *use* of language. In consequence, a speech community is seen as being composed of those who share functional rules that determine the appropriacy of utterances. Finally, there are those such as Hymes who argue for multiple criteria:

A speech community is defined, then, tautologically but radically, as a community sharing knowledge of rules for the conduct and interpretation of speech. Such sharing comprises knowledge of at least one form of speech, and knowledge also of its patterns of use. Both conditions are necessary.

(Hymes, 1974:51)

There are a number of reasons why I believe even a tight definition of speech community (shared linguistic forms, shared regulative rules and shared cultural concepts) will not result in making an alternative definition of discourse community unnecessary. The first is concerned with medium; not so much in the trivial sense that 'speech' just will not do as an exclusive modifier of communities that are often heavily engaged in writing, but rather in terms of what that literary activity implies. Literacy takes away locality and parochiality, for members are more likely to communicate with other members in distant places, and are more likely to react and respond to writings rather than speech from the past.

A second reason for separating the two concepts derives from the need to distinguish a *sociolinguistic* grouping from a *sociorhetorical* one. In a sociolinguistic speech community, the communicative needs of the group, such as socialization or group solidarity, tend to predominate in the development and maintenance of its discursive characteristics. The primary determinants of linguistic behavior are social. However, in a sociorhetorical discourse community, the primary determinants of linguistic behavior are functional, since a discourse community consists of a group of people who link up in order to pursue objectives that are prior to those of socialization and solidarity, even if these latter should consequently occur. In a discourse community, the communicative needs of the goals tend to predominate in the development and maintenance of its discursive characteristics.

Thirdly, in terms of the fabric of society, speech communities are centripetal (they tend to absorb people into that general fabric), whereas discourse communities are centrifugal (they tend to separate people into occupational or speciality-interest groups). A speech community typically inherits its membership by birth, accident or adoption; a discourse community recruits its members by persuasion, training or relevant qualification. To borrow a term from the kind of association readers of this book are likely to belong to, an archetypal discourse community tends to be a *Specific Interest Group*.

2.3 A conceptualization of discourse community

I would now like to propose six defining characteristics that will be necessary and sufficient for identifying a group of individuals as a discourse community.

1. A discourse community has a broadly agreed set of common public goals.

These public goals may be formally inscribed in documents (as is often the case with associations and clubs), or they may be more tacit. The

goals are *public*, because spies may join speech and discourse communities for hidden purposes of subversion, while more ordinary people may join organizations with private hopes of commercial or romantic advancement. In some instances, but not in many, the goals may be high level or abstract. In a Senate or Parliament there may well exist overtly adversarial groups of members, but these adversaries may broadly share some common objective as striving for improved government. In the much more typical non-adversarial discourse communities, reduction in the broad level of agreement may fall to a point where communication breaks down and the discourse community splits. It is commonality of goal, not shared object of study that is criterial, even if the former often subsumes the latter. But not always. The fact that the shared object of study is, say, the Vatican, does not imply that students of the Vatican in history departments, the Kremlin, dioceses, birth control agencies and liberation theology seminaries form a discourse community.

2. A discourse community has mechanisms of intercommunication among its members.

The participatory mechanisms will vary according to the community: meetings, telecommunications, correspondence, newsletters, conversations and so forth. This criterion is quite stringent because it produces a negative answer to the case of 'The Café Owner Problem' (Najjar, personal communication). In generalized form, the problem goes as follows: individuals A, B, C and so on occupy the same professional roles in life. They interact (in speech and writing) with the same clientele; they originate, receive and respond to the same kind of messages for the same purposes; they have an approximately similar range of genre skills. And yet, as café owners working long hours in their own establishments, and not being members of the Local Chamber of Commerce, A, B and C never interact with one another. Do they form a discourse community? We can notice first that 'The Café Owner Problem' is not quite like those situations where A, B and C operate as 'point'. A, B and C may be lighthouse keepers on their lonely rocks, or missionaries in their separate jungles, or neglected consular officials in their rotting outposts. In all these cases, although A, B and C may never interact, they all have lines of communication back to base, and presumably acquired discourse community membership as a key element in their initial training.

Bizzell (1987) argues that the café owner kind of social group will be a discourse community because 'its members may share the social-class-based or ethnically-based discursive practices of people who are likely to become café owners in their neighborhood' (1987:5). However, even if this sharing of discursive practice occurs, it does not resolve the logical problem of assigning membership of a community to individuals who neither admit nor recognize that such a community exists.

3. *A discourse community uses its participatory mechanisms primarily to provide information and feedback.*

Thus, membership implies uptake of the informational opportunities. Individuals might pay an annual subscription to the *Acoustical Society of America* but if they never open any of its communications they cannot be said to belong to the discourse community, even though they are formally members of the society. The secondary purposes of the information exchange will vary according to the common goals: to improve performance in a football squad or in an orchestra, to make money in a brokerage house, to grow better roses in a gardening club, or to dent the research front in an academic department.

4. *A discourse community utilizes and hence possesses one or more genres in the communicative furtherance of its aims.*

A discourse community has developed and continues to develop discursive expectations. These may involve appropriacy of topics, the form, function and positioning of discursive elements, and the roles texts play in the operation of the discourse community. In so far as 'genres are how things get done, when language is used to accomplish them' (Martin, 1985:250), these discursive expectations are created by the *genres* that articulate the operations of the discourse community. One of the purposes of this criterion is to question discourse community status for new or newly-emergent groupings. Such groupings need, as it were, to settle down and work out their communicative proceedings and practices before they can be recognized as discourse communities. If a new grouping 'borrows' genres from other discourse communities, such borrowings have to be assimilated.

5. *In addition to owning genres, a discourse community has acquired some specific lexis.*

This specialization may involve using lexical items known to the wider speech communities in special and technical ways, as in information technology discourse communities, or using highly technical terminology as in medical communities. Most commonly, however, the inbuilt dynamic towards an increasingly shared and specialized terminology is realized through the development of community-specific abbreviations and acronyms. The use of these (ESL, EAP, WAC, NCTE, TOEFL, etc.) is, of course, driven by the requirements for efficient communication exchange between experts. It is hard to conceive, at least in the contemporary English-speaking world, of a group of well-established members of a discourse community communicating among themselves on topics relevant to the goals of the community and not using lexical items puzzling to outsiders. It is hard to imagine attending perchance the convention of some group of which one is an outsider and understanding every word. If it were to happen – as might occur in the inaugural

meeting of some quite new grouping – then that grouping would not yet constitute a discourse community.

6. *A discourse community has a threshold level of members with a suitable degree of relevant content and discursive expertise.*

Discourse communities have changing memberships; individuals enter as apprentices and leave by death or in other less involuntary ways. However, survival of the community depends on a reasonable ratio between novices and experts.

2.4 An example of a discourse community

As we have seen, those interested in discourse communities have typically sited their discussions within academic contexts, thus possibly creating a false impression that such communities are only to be associated with intellectual paradigms or scholarly cliques. Therefore, for my principal example of a discourse community, I have deliberately chosen one that is not academic, but which nevertheless is probably typical enough of many others. The discourse community is a hobby group and has an 'umbrella organization' called the Hong Kong Study Circle, of which I happen to be a member. The aims of the HKSC (note the abbreviation) are to foster interest in and knowledge of the stamps of Hong Kong (the various printings, etc.) and of their uses (postal rates, cancellations, etc.). Currently there are about 320 members scattered across the world, but with major concentrations in Great Britain, the USA and Hong Kong itself and minor ones in Holland and Japan. Based on the membership list, my guess is that about a third of the members are non-native speakers of English and about a fifth women. The membership varies in other ways: a few are rich and have acquired world-class collections of classic rarities, but many are not and pursue their hobby interest with material that costs very little to acquire. Some are full-time specialist dealers, auctioneers and catalogue publishers, but most are collectors. From what little I know, the collectors vary greatly in occupation. One standard reference work was co-authored by a stamp dealer and a Dean at Yale; another was written by a retired Lieutenant-Colonel. The greatest authority on the nineteenth century carriage of Hong Kong mail, with three books to his credit, has recently retired from a lifetime of service as a signaller with British Rail. I mention these brief facts to show that the members of the discourse community have, superficially at least, nothing in common except their shared hobby interest, although Bizzell (forthcoming) is probably correct in pointing out that there may be psychological predispositions that attract particular people to collecting and make them 'kindred spirits'.

The main mechanism, or 'forum' (Herrington, 1985) for inter-communication is a bi-monthly Journal and Newsletter, the latest to arrive being No. 265. There are scheduled meetings, including an Annual General Meeting, that takes place in London, but rarely more than a dozen members attend. There is a certain amount of correspondence and some phoning, but without the Journal/Newsletter I doubt the discourse community would survive. The combined periodical often has a highly interactive content as the following extracts show:

2. Hong Kong, Type 12, with Index

No one has yet produced another example of this c.d.s. that I mentioned on J.256/7 as having been found with an index letter 'C' with its opening facing downwards, but Mr. Scamp reports that he has seen one illustrated in an auction catalogue having a normal 'C' and dated MY 9/59 (Type 12 is the 20 mm single-circle broken in upper half by HONG KONG). It must be in someone's collection!

3. The B.P.O.'s in Kobe and Nagasaki

Mr. Pullan disputes the statement at the top of J.257/3 that 'If the postal clerk had not violated regulations by affixing the MR 17/79 (HIOGO) datestamp on the front, we might have no example of this c.d.s. at all.' He states that 'By 1879 it was normal practice for the sorter's datestamp to be struck on the front, the change from the back of the cover occurring generally in 1877, though there are isolated earlier examples'; thus there was no violation of regulations.

My own early attempts to be a full member of the community were not marked by success. Early on I published an article in the journal which used a fairly complex frequency analysis of occurrence – derived from Applied Linguistics – in order to offer an alternative explanation of a puzzle well known to members of the HKSC. The only comments that this effort to establish credibility elicited were 'too clever by half' and 'Mr Swales, we won't change our minds without a chemical analysis'. I have also had to learn over time the particular terms of approval and disapproval for a philatelic item (cf. Becher, 1981) such as 'significant', 'useful', 'normal', and not to comment directly on the monetary value of such items.

Apart from the conventions governing articles, queries and replies in the Journal/Newsletter, the discourse community has developed a genre-specific set of conventions for describing items of Hong Kong postal history. These occur in members' collections, whether for display or not, and are found in somewhat more abbreviated forms in specialized auction catalogues, as in the following example:

1176 1899 Combination PPC to Europe franked CIP 4 C cancelled large CANTON dollar chop, pair HK 2 C carmine added & Hong Kong index B cds. Arr cds. (1) (Photo) HK \$1500.

Even if luck and skill were to combine to interpret PPC as 'picture postcard', CIP as 'Chinese Imperial Post', a 'combination' as a postal item legitimately combining the stamps of two or more nations and so on, an outsider would still not be in a position to estimate whether 1500 Hong Kong dollars would be an appropriate sum to bid. However, the distinction between insider and outsider is not absolute but consists of gradations. A professional stamp dealer not dealing in Hong Kong material would have a useful general schema, while a member of a very similar discourse community, say the China Postal History Society, may do as well as a member of the HKSC because of overlapping goals.

The discourse community I have discussed meets all six of the proposed defining criteria: there are common goals, participatory mechanisms, information exchange, community specific genres, a highly specialized terminology and a high general level of expertise. On the other hand, distance between members geographically, ethnically and socially presumably means that they do not form a speech community.

2.5 Remaining issues

If we now return to Herzberg's 'cluster of ideas' quoted near the beginning of this section, we can see that the first two (language use is a form of social behaviour, and discourse maintains and extends a group's knowledge) accord with the conceptualization of discourse community proposed here. The third is the claim that 'discourse is epistemic or constitutive of the group's knowledge' (Herzberg, 1986:1). This claim is also advanced, although in slightly different form, in a forthcoming paper by Bizzell:

In the absence of consensus, let me offer a tentative definition: a 'discourse community' is a group of people who share certain language-using practices. These practices can be seen as conventionalized in two ways. Stylistic conventions regulate social interactions both within the group and in its dealings with outsiders: to this extent 'discourse community' borrows from the sociolinguistic concept of 'speech community'. Also, canonical knowledge regulates the world-views of group members, how they interpret experience; to this extent 'discourse community' borrows from the literary-critical concept of 'interpretive community'.

(Bizzell, forthcoming: 1)

The issue of whether a community's discourse and its discursive expectations are constitutive or regulative of world-view is a contemporary reworking of the Whorfian hypothesis that each language possesses a structure which must at some level influence the way its users view the world (Carroll, 1956). The issue is an important one, because as Bizzell

later observes 'If we acknowledge that participating in a discourse community entails some assimilation of its world view, then it becomes difficult to maintain the position that discourse conventions can be employed in a detached, instrumental way' (Bizzell, forthcoming: 9).

However, this is precisely the position I wish to maintain, especially if *can be employed* is interpreted as *may sometimes be employed*. There are several reasons for this. First, it is possible to deny the premise that participation entails assimilation. There are enough spies, undercover agents and fifth columnists in the world to suggest that non-assimilation is at least possible. Spies are only successful if they participate successfully in the relevant speech and discourse communities of the domain which they have infiltrated; however, if they also *assimilate* they cease to be single spies but become double agents. On a less dramatic level, there is enough pretense, deception and face-work around to suggest that the acting out of roles is not that uncommon; and to take a relatively innocuous context, a prospective son-in-law may pretend to be an active and participating member of a bridge-playing community in order to make a favorable impression on his prospective parents-in-law.

Secondly, sketching the boundaries of discourse communities in ways that I have attempted implies (a) that individuals may belong to several discourse communities and (b) that individuals will vary in the number of discourse communities they belong to and hence in the number of genres they command. At one extreme there may be a sense of discourse community deprivation – 'Cooped up in the house with the children all day'. At the other extreme, there stand the skilled professional journalists with their chameleon-like ability to assume temporary membership of a wide range of discourse communities. These observations suggest discourse communities will vary, both intrinsically and in terms of the member's perspective, in the degree to which they impose a world-view. Belonging to the Hong Kong Study Circle is not likely to be as constitutive as abandoning the world for the seclusion of a closed religious order.

Thirdly, to deny the instrumental employment of discourse conventions is to threaten one common type of apprenticeship and to cast a hegemonical shadow over international education. Students taking a range of different courses often operate successfully as 'ethnographers' of these various academic milieux (Johns, 1988a) and do so with sufficient detachment and instrumentality to avoid developing multiple personalities, even if, with more senior and specialized students, the epistemic nature of the discourse may be more apparent, as the interesting case study by Berkenkotter et al. (1988) shows. I would also like to avoid taking a position whereby a foreign student is seen, via participation, to assimilate inevitably the world-view of the host discourse community. While this may happen, I would not want to accept that discourse

conventions cannot be successfully deployed in an instrumental manner (see James, 1980 for further discussion of variability in foreign student roles). Overall, the extent to which discourse is constitutive of world-view would seem to be a matter of investigation rather than assumption.

Just as, for my applied purposes, I do not want to accept assimilation of world-view as criterial, so neither do I want to accept a threshold level of personal involvement as criterial. While it may be high in a small business, a class or a department, and may be notoriously high among members of amateur dramatic discourse communities, the fact remains that the active members of the Hong Kong Study Circle – to use an example already discussed – form a successful discourse community despite a very low level of personal involvement. Nor is centrality to the main affairs of life, family, work, money, education, and so on, criterial. Memberships of hobby groups may be quite peripheral, while memberships of professional associations may be closely connected to the business of a career (shockingly so as when a member is *debarred*), but both may equally constitute discourse communities. Finally, discourse communities will vary in the extent to which they are norm-developed, or have their set and settled ways. Some, at a particular moment in time, will be highly conservative ('these are things that have been and remain'), while others may be norm-developing and in a state of flux (Kuhn, 1970; Huckin, 1987).

The delineation of these variable features throws interesting light on the fine study of contexts for writing in two senior college Chemical Engineering classes by Herrington (1985). Herrington concluded the Lab course and Design Process course 'represented distinct communities where different issues were addressed, different lines of reasoning used, different writer and audience roles assumed, and different social purposes served by writing' (1985:331). (If we also note that the two courses were taught in the same department at the same institution by the same staff to largely the same students, then the Herrington study suggests additionally that there may be more of invention than we would like to see in our models of disciplinary culture.) The disparities between the two courses can be interpreted in the following way. Writing in the Lab course was central to the 'display familiarity' macro-act of college assignments (Horowitz, 1986a) – which the students were accustomed to. Writing in the Design course was central to the persuasive reporting macro-act of the looming professional world, which the students were not accustomed to. The Lab course was *norm-developed*, while the Design course was *norm-developing*. As Herrington observes, in Lab both students and faculty were all too aware that the conceptual issue in the assignments was *not* an issue for the audience – the professor knew the answers. But it was an issue in Design. As a part consequence, the level of *personal involvement* was much higher in the Design course

where professor and student interacted together in a joint problem-solving environment.

The next issue to be addressed in this section is whether certain groupings, including academic classes, constitute *discourse* communities. Given the six criteria, it would seem clear that shareholders of General Motors, members of the Book of the Month Club, voters for a particular political party, clienteles of restaurants and bars (except perhaps in soap-operas), employees of a university, and inhabitants of an apartment block all fail to qualify. But what about academic classes? Except in exceptional cases of well-knit groups of advanced students already familiar with much of the material, an academic class is unlikely to be a discourse community at the outset. However, the hoped-for outcome is that it will form a discourse community (McKenna, 1987). Somewhere down the line, broad agreement on goals will be established, a full range of participatory mechanisms will be created, information exchange and feedback will flourish by peer-review and instructor commentary, understanding the rationale of and facility with appropriate genres will develop, control of the technical vocabulary in both oral and written contexts will emerge, and a level of expertise that permits critical thinking be made manifest. Thus it turns out that providing a relatively constrained operational set of criteria for defining discourse communities also provides a coign of vantage, if from the applied linguist's corner, for assessing educational processes and for reviewing what needs to be done to assist non-native speakers and others to engage fully in them.

Finally, it is necessary to concede that the account I have provided of discourse community, for all its attempts to offer a set of pragmatic and operational criteria, remains in at least one sense somewhat removed from reality. It is utopian and 'oddly free of many of the tensions, discontinuities and conflicts in the sorts of talk and writing that go on everyday in the classrooms and departments of an actual university' (Harris, 1989:14). Bizzell (1987) too has claimed that discourse communities can be healthy and yet contain contradictions; and Herrington (1989) continues to describe composition researchers as a 'community' while unveiling the tensions and divisions within the group. The precise status of conflictive discourse communities is doubtless a matter for future study, but here it can at least be accepted that discourse communities can, over a period of time, lose as well as gain consensus, and at some critical juncture, be so divided as to be on the point of splintering.

3 *The concept of genre*

Genre is a term which, as Preston says, one approaches with some trepidation (Preston, 1986). The word is highly attractive – even to the Parisian timbre of its normal pronunciation – but extremely slippery. As a first step in the arduous process of pinning it down, I shall discount all uses of the term to refer to non-verbal objects. These include the original meaning of the term (in English) to refer to a type of small picture representing a scene from everyday domestic life and its growing employment as a fancy way of referring to classes of real world entities. The latter is illustrated in Webster's *Third New International Dictionary* by 'large floppy rag dolls, a *genre* favored by two-year olds'.

The use of *genre* relevant to this study is glossed by Webster's *Third* as 'a distinctive type or category of literary composition'; however, the dictionary's citation – from *The New Yorker* – usefully expands the context of literary to include 'such unpromising *genres* as Indian Treaties, colonial promotional tracts and theological works'. Indeed today, *genre* is quite easily used to refer to a distinctive category of discourse of any type, spoken or written, with or without literary aspirations. So when we now hear or read of 'the genre of the Presidential Press Conference', 'the new genre of the music video' or 'the survival of game-show genres', we do so, I believe, without feeling that a term proper to rhetorical or literary studies has been maladroitly usurped.

Even so, genre remains a fuzzy concept, a somewhat loose term of art. Worse, especially in the US, genre has in recent years become associated with a disreputably formulaic way of constructing (or aiding the construction of) particular texts – a kind of writing or speaking by numbers. This association characterizes genre as mere mechanism, and hence is inimical to the enlightened and enlightening concept that language is ultimately a matter of *choice*. The issue then is whether genre as a structuring device for language teaching is doomed to encourage the unthinking application of formulas, or whether such an outcome is rather an oversimplification brought about by pedagogical convenience. An initial way of tackling the issue is to examine what scholars have actually said about genres in a number of fields. For this purpose, the following four sections briefly consider uses of the term in folklore, literary